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Global Europe and the Next MFF: What to Watch

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At a glance

- **Country-level positions on Global Europe can converge on the strategic rationale, yet budget commitments are missing.** France (steering and migration leverage), Poland (enlargement and the east), and Lithuania (security and Ukraine) all frame Global Europe in terms of European strategic interests, while continuing to defend cohesion and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Yet none has specified a preferred Heading 3 envelope reacting to the Irish negotiating box. National ODA trends offer little reassurance: all three countries remain below their target and have been declining in recent years.
- **The Irish negotiating box proposes deep cuts but fails to secure political backing.** The Irish Presidency's negotiating box of 10 Oct. proposes an 8% reduction in the overall MFF compared with the Commission's proposal. Heading 3 bears the largest reduction: 17.4%, more than four times the 3.9% cut in the Cyprus negotiating box. Within Heading 3, the Global Europe Instrument (GEI) is cut by 15.7%. The Ukraine Reserve remains unchanged. The proposal failed to secure consensus at the October European Council, leaving European Council President António Costa to take the negotiations forward**.**
- **The box also reshapes the GEI**. It sets a minimum programmable share of at least 70% (still bracketed), an indicative 10% allocation for the external dimension of migration, and reduces the maximum amount of financial support through guarantees and loans from €95 billion to €80 billion. These provisions remain subject to negotiation, but point to a stronger emphasis on geographic programming alongside a more targeted use of financial instruments.
- **No agreement in October, but some signs of movement at the margins.** The European Council left the main divisions between frugal countries and the Friends of Cohesion unresolved. Yet, the tone was not uniformly negative: Friedrich Merz described the Irish proposal as 'moving in the right direction', while still insufficient; Sweden signalled little urgency to reach a deal; and Emmanuel Macron warned of the political difficulties of concluding an agreement as France approaches its 2027 presidential election. The pressure to reach a deal by December therefore remains, but the October summit exposed how difficult that timetable may be.
- **Costa takes over**. After bilaterals with the 27 permanent representatives, Costa will table a new negotiating box before the special European Council of 26–27 Nov., based on a recalibrated own-resources package and stronger crisis flexibility. That summit will also tackle Ukraine's 2027 financing gap (up to €70 billion), which some frugal countries are reportedly linking to the MFF.

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- **The European Parliament re-enters the negotiations.** Following the resolution of the deadlock over the Performance Regulation, AFET and DEVE adopted their report on the GEI on 19 Oct., with plenary confirmation of the negotiating mandate expected on 11–12 Nov. Parliament calls for a €225 billion envelope and a 93% ODA share, alongside stronger parliamentary scrutiny through delegated acts that would allow Parliament and Council to object to policy-based loans and programming decisions. Meanwhile, the leaders of the EPP, S&D, Renew, and Greens groups have jointly criticised the proposed cuts to Headings 2 and 3.
- **Next dates.** Costa's compromise paper (ahead of 26-27 Nov.); EP plenary (11–12 Nov.); informal summit in Dublin (13 Nov.); special European Council (26–27 Nov.); December European Council, the target for agreement (17–18 Dec.)



Member States' moving red lines, Costa's push, and Parliament's next move

This month's briefing continues our Member State intelligence series, tracking how national positions have evolved across the three MFF headings, with a particular focus on Global Europe. Following our analyses of Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands, we turn to France, where political uncertainty and polarisation pose significant risks; Poland, which strongly defends CAP and Cohesion Policy while holding enlargement and Ukraine as key priorities; and Lithuania, which will take over the Council Presidency in January. We also examine how each country's approach to ODA has evolved. Section 2 examines the Irish negotiating box and António Costa's efforts to prepare the ground for the final stages of negotiations. Section 3 focuses on the European Parliament committees' approval of the Global Europe Instrument.

1. Member State intelligence: France, Poland, Lithuania

The push by frugal countries for further cuts to the Irish negotiating proposal is forcing Member States to clarify their red lines, but the traditional divide between net contributors and the 'Friends of Cohesion' is becoming less straightforward. Countries are defending familiar priorities, while also weighing new strategic concerns and the trade-offs between them. For Global Europe, the question is whether growing geopolitical ambitions will translate into budgetary protection or remain subordinate to pressure to contain the overall MFF.

This month's country intelligence examines **France, Poland, and Lithuania**, tracking how their positions across the three MFF headings have evolved between mid-2025 (publication of the Commission proposal) and 1 Nov. 2026.

Three different routes to Global Europe. All three countries **defend cohesion and the CAP**, **but their priorities beyond traditional EU spending differ**. France emphasises European preference, Member State steering and the use of external policy to advance migration objectives and European security interests. Poland sees Global Europe primarily through enlargement and the eastern neighbourhood. Lithuania places external action firmly within a broader security agenda centred on Ukraine, the eastern border and resilience. These positions suggest that support for **Global Europe may increasingly rest on its contribution to European strategic interests**. Yet, this potential convergence has not translated into clear budgetary commitments: **none of the three countries has publicly stated a specific preferred envelope for Heading 3,** or reacted to cuts proposed in the Irish negotiating box.

Traditional budgetary priorities remain an important constraint (Table 1). All three countries continue to defend cohesion and the CAP, albeit with different emphases: France seeks to protect agriculture and fisheries; Poland favours larger national envelopes; and Lithuania opposes financing new priorities at their expense. Poland and Lithuania are also members of the Friends of Cohesion, while



France has not formally aligned with either negotiating camp. These positions illustrate how support for new EU-level priorities clashes with established national spending interests. The key question is whether the strategic case for Global Europe will be strong enough to secure support for its funding when the overall MFF trade-offs are settled**.**

Table 1. Country positions' developments across MFF headings (mid-2025-1 November 2026)

	France	Poland	Lithuania
Overall MFF	No size figure stated. Agreement on new own resources as a precondition for a balanced deal. Traditionally supportive of an ambitious EU budget. Growing domestic pressure to reduce net contribution to the budget **(No clear alignment with either group).**	No size figure stated. A larger EU budget is in the interest of every EU Member State. Agreement in favour of new own resources seen as necessary to sustain the Commission's proposal, but leading the opposition to the ETS **(Friends of Cohesion)**	Advocates a larger EU budget to finance security and defence, competitiveness and Ukraine, alongside cohesion and the CAP. Open to discussing new own resources **(Friends of Cohesion)**
Heading 1: CAP and cohesion	**Protects sectoral priorities.** Supports ring-fencing agriculture and fisheries	**Seeks larger national envelopes.** Resists reductions to traditional policies; domestic and regional actors remain wary of centralisation.	**Defends existing priorities.** Wants cohesion and the CAP protected from pressure to finance new priorities, including security.
Heading 2: Competitiveness	**European preference.** Supports directing EU funding towards European actors, particularly in defence.	**Conditional support.** The Fund remains an option, but defence funding should not be cut.	**Security-led competitiveness.** Defends defence, military mobility and Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) funding.
Heading 3: Global Europe	**Control and leverage.** Seeks strong Member State strategic steering; opposes financing return hubs from Global Europe as development aid and supports migration conditionality. No stated budget figure.	**Enlargement and neighbourhood.** Supports a stronger Member State role, flexibility and migration conditionality, subject to the final text. No stated budget figure.	**External action as strategic investment.** Wants Global Europe to combine development, investment and geopolitical objectives, with Ukraine and eastern-border security central. No stated budget figure.



ODA at the national level	**Pressure on national spending.** Government statements point to shrinking national credits and increasingly selective choices.	**Mixed signals**. Humanitarian aid reached a record in 2025, up over 20%; a July draft programme restates the aim of 0.33% of GNI by 2030.	**Security and resilience.** Development cooperation is increasingly framed through these priorities; the newer Member States' aim of 0.33% of GNI by 2030 applies.
Rebates	**Position stable.** Ending all rebates (Dec. 2025), restated with Italy (June 2026).	**Position reinforced.** Supports ending corrections for net contributors.	**Stable.** Co-signed with the Friends of Cohesion, no subsequent national statement was identified.
Domestic institutional tensions	**Unresolved.** The Sénat opposes single national plans for CAP; parties in the Assemblée nationale committee are divided over France's 2027 EU budget contribution (€30.9 billion).	**Unresolved.** Disagreement over the implications of milestone-based funding, including whether it supports industrial policy or risks becoming a mechanism of political conditionality.	**Limited evidence of contestation.** The available material records formal approvals and a closed-sitting committee item, but little public debate.

Global Europe: three country positions, three strategic lenses

France: clear on governance and migration leverage, less so on figures. France's position on Global Europe is more clearly articulated on how the instrument should be governed than on how much it should receive. Government statements call for a leading strategic role for Member States, a position reflected in the France–Italy joint statement on Member State-led governance. On migration, France favours stronger conditionality across ODA, trade preferences and visas, but opposes financing return hubs from Global Europe as development aid.

The French position also links external action to wider strategic interests. The Government has stressed the eligibility of overseas countries and territories for Global Europe funding (Heading 3), a merit-based approach to enlargement, and support for Ukraine. The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot has also called for 'an ambitious EU budget (…) to preserve the EU's role as the world's largest humanitarian donor'. He has defended humanitarian aid that is needs-based, respects the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, and is delivered without conditionality. These statements signal France's broader ambition for the EU's external role, but do not indicate a preferred funding level for Global Europe.

***What to watch*:** whether France turns its emphasis on Europe's strategic interests



and ambitious humanitarian role into a clear defence of the Global Europe budget, and whether its support for stronger migration conditionality is reflected in the final governance arrangements for the instrument.

Poland: enlargement as bridge between national priorities and Global Europe. Poland offers the clearest indication among the three countries that Global Europe's architecture may be acceptable. In June, Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ignacy Niemczycki described Global Europe as the most satisfactory of three sectoral regulations under discussion in the Council. He highlighted the inclusion of enlargement among the instrument's objectives, a stronger Member State role in implementation and the retention of migration conditionality. Support nevertheless remained conditional on the final text, and no preferred figure for Global Europe was stated.

Poland's strategic priorities are also explicit. The Government has called for greater attention to Ukraine, enlargement countries and eastern partners, while insisting that accession must remain merit-based and take Polish sectoral sensitivities into account, chiefly agriculture, the agri-food industry and transport, which it sees as most exposed to Ukraine's entry into the single market.

***What to watch*:** whether Poland's support for enlargement and the eastern neighbourhood translates into protection for Global Europe, particularly if cohesion, agriculture and defence compete for limited resources.

Lithuania: Global Europe as an instrument of European security. Lithuania articulates the most explicit link between Global Europe and the EU's security interests. In October, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Sigitas Mitkus said the instrument must remain the EU's main external action tool, combining development cooperation, investment, economic partnerships and geopolitical objectives. Lithuania accepted the Council's partial approaches in June but hopes that later negotiations will reflect the specific needs of the eastern border, critical infrastructure and the links between security and competitiveness.

Ukraine is central to this position. Lithuania repeatedly called for the completion of the approval process for the €90 billion loan to Ukraine agreed by the European Council in December 2025. The process was delayed after Hungary and Slovakia blocked the necessary amendment to the MFF regulation in February 2026; the blockage was lifted in April. Looking ahead, Lithuania wants the next MFF to sustain support for Ukraine, with a significant share provided on a non-repayable basis. Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius has also framed Ukraine's EU accession as a strategic investment in long-term European security. Finance Minister Taurimas Valys has stated that, if MFF negotiations extend into 2027, Lithuania will defend sufficient and sustainable support for Ukraine during its Council Presidency.

Lithuania has not specified a preferred Global Europe envelope. Its reaction to the Irish negotiating box on 13 Oct. focused on proposed reductions to strategic




programmes, particularly defence, military mobility and the Connecting Europe Facility, without addressing Global Europe specifically.

What to watch: whether Lithuania uses its forthcoming Council Presidency to defend the links between Global Europe, support Ukraine and eastern-border security, and whether this translates into support for the instrument's budget rather than only its objectives.

Recent developments in national Official Development Assistance

Recent developments in National ODA for the three selected Member States can help gauge each country's means and appetite for Heading 3. **All three sit well below their respective ODA/GNI targets** – 0.7% for Member States that joined the EU pre-2004 and 0.33% for those having joined post-2004 (Council doc. 9285/26, p. 9). All have seen recent declines (Figure 1).

Figure 1. ODA-to-GNI rates (2021-2025) against EU targets.



Source: own elaboration, from OECD Cooperation Profiles (2023-2026); Lithuanian MFA (2021).

France was the sixth-largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in 2025 (OECD, 2026) and the **one with the largest global footprint of all three**: 249 diplomatic posts (Lowy Institute, 2024) and strong Public Development Institutions (PDIs), led by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD). France coordinates its

Global Gateway engagement through 'Team France', with EU institutions as its main multilateral partner (Expertise France, 2025; OECD, 2026). French ODA volumes are falling: from 0.48% of GNI in 2024 (€14.3 billion) to 0.42% in 2025, a 10.9% real-terms drop (Focus 2030, 2025; OECD, 2026), driven by budgetary constraints and rearmament priorities (Sénat, 2025). Paris increasingly relies on AFD, which leverages market borrowing to multiply its budget roughly sixfold, keeping part of France's development assistance off-balance sheet (OECD, 2026; Sylla, 2024). Africa remains the priority, receiving 41.1% of gross bilateral ODA in 2024, with a focus on education, governance, infrastructure and climate (OECD, 2026).

Poland's ODA is volatile and shaped by Ukraine. It rose 272.1% in real terms in 2022, to 0.53% of GNI, with in-donor refugee costs making up 62.7% of the total. It then fell by 26.8% in 2024 as those costs eased (OECD, 2025; 2026). Programmable aid is thin: in 2023, refugee costs were 77.5% of gross bilateral ODA, reaching €1.2 billion against €86.9 million (5.5%) of country-programmable aid in 2023 prices (OECD, 2025). Poland's sole PDI, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), delivers mostly non-ODA investments, though it manages an EFSD+ guarantee of up to €115 million for Global Gateway digital connectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa (European Commission, 2025). Geographically, Poland looks East: it co-initiated the Eastern Partnership with Sweden and treats aid largely as an enlargement tool.

Lithuania is the smallest donor of the three. ODA fell to 0.24% of GNI in 2024, reaching €178.8 million ($193.4 million in 2024 prices) and, on preliminary data, to 0.21% in 2025, representing €170.2 million (or $192.3 million in 2025 prices) short of its 0.33% target for 2030 (OECD, 2025; 2026). After peaking in 2022 at €231 million (0.36% of GNI), driven by Ukraine-related cost expenditure, the decline mirrors Lithuania's migration policy priorities: in-donor refugee costs fell from €70.3 million in 2022 to €12.95 million in 2024 (Lithuanian MFA, 2025). Being a DAC member since 2022, Lithuania mobilises only grants, almost all untied (94% in 2024), and channels most of its ODA through EU institutions ($109.1 million in 2024). Aid is concentrated on Ukraine (93.1% of ODA to Europe in 2023) and humanitarian assistance (36.1% of bilateral commitments), both framed as 'security policy': through targeted activities.



Table 2. Overview of key national ODA features

	France	Poland	Lithuania
ODA/GNI 2025	0.42%	0.16%	0.21%
Recent real-terms change 2025 (prelim.)	–10.9%	–19%	–9.7%
Main driver	Budget, rearmament	Falling refugee costs	Falling refugee costs
Geographic focus	Africa	Ukraine, Eastern Europe	Ukraine
Tools	PDIs, loans	BGK guarantee, programmable aid	Grants only
EU link	Team France, EU as main partner	Eastern Partnership, EFSD+	EU main channel

Three points stand out. First, **none of the three is a growing donor**: budget pressure and security spending are squeezing ODA. Second, **priorities differ:** While France's priority is Africa, Poland and Lithuania look to Ukraine, the neighbourhood and enlargement, so the debate over the split between GEI pillars may map onto an East-South divide. Third, the **EU is already a central channel for Lithuania and for Poland's eastern priorities, and a key partner for France**. Support for common EU spending is therefore plausible, although each country may support it for a different purpose.

Overall, the national ODA picture offers little reassurance. France faces pressure on national development cooperation budgets, Poland keeps its aim of 0.33% of GNI by 2030, and Lithuania increasingly links development cooperation to security and resilience. The three countries also approach Global Europe very differently. Yet, all three frame external action in terms of European interests, creating a possible basis for cross-country support that cuts across the traditional frugal–cohesion divide.

The unresolved issue is whether this partial convergence can withstand budgetary pressures, at both the domestic and EU levels. All three defend established spending priorities, and none has publicly committed to a specific Global Europe envelope. The signal to watch is therefore whether Member States' endorsement for Global Europe's strategic role is accompanied by a willingness to protect its funding when the final MFF trade-offs become concrete.



2. MFF negotiations: Costa takes the lead

On 10 Oct. 2026, the Irish presidency presented the second negotiating box with figures. The document proposed an **8% real terms cut** against the Commission's MFF proposal (-€141 billion at 2025 prices), with reductions unevenly distributed across headings and programmes. According to the Irish government, the proposed MFF would represent 1.16% of EU GNI against the original 1.26% GNI proposal presented by the Commission (both figures including NGEU payments). While before its release, there was an expectation that the Irish negotiating box might set the stage for the final negotiations, the proposal is politically dead, with Costa needing to go back to the drawing board. Key features of the Irish negotiating box included:

- **Heading 1** (National and Regional Partnership Plans) is cut by 3.4%. Cohesion policy and agricultural funds are preserved, with all reductions concentrated on the EU Facility (-42.5%) – an EU-managed envelope intended to support cross-border projects and respond to crises.
- **Heading 2** (Competitiveness) **and Heading 3** (Global Europe) are cut by 12.8% and 17.4%, respectively, while **Heading 4** is reduced by 8.8%.
- **Crisis-response programmes and instruments** face particularly severe cuts, including a 55% reduction in the EU Solidarity Fund and a 35% reduction in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Crisis-response reserves are also reduced: the EU Facility cushion is eliminated while the Global Europe cushion is cut by 24%. Unallocated margins are reduced by 50% under Heading 1, 50% under Heading 2 and 70% under Heading 3.
- **Global Europe Instrument (GEI)** faces a 15.7% cut, unevenly distributed across the different pillars. All the geographic pillars are cut by 14.4%, whereas the global pillar and the cushion suffer higher cuts (-24.5% and -24%, respectively).
- **No changes to the budget for the Ukraine Reserve,** which is placed outside the MFF ceilings[1] and is dedicated to financial support to Ukraine (€100 billion in current prices, €88.9 billion in 2025 prices).
- **Minor changes to Own Resources.** The negotiating box includes the five own resources proposed by the European Commission (ETS1, CORE, TEDOR, e-waste, CBAM) with only two amendments: the Own resource based on the collection of 30% of revenues from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is phased in for the 13 beneficiary countries of the Modernisation Fund (mainly eastern and southern European countries) and the call rate on revenues from the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is raised to 90% up from 75% (an adjustment that, according to the Commission's calculations would generate only an additional €0.3 billion per year).

The Irish document also included some novelties on the GEI goals/design with respect to the Cyprus negotiating box:

- Proposal to introduce a minimum target for programmable actions (70%) with the figure remaining within brackets, indicating lack of agreement.

[1] This reserve is intended to cover all non-repayable support to Ukraine over 2028–2034, including grants and the provision of budgetary guarantees to implementing partners such as the EIB. In addition to that, the Commission´s GEI draft proposal sets a financial cap of € 100 billion on the combined support to Ukraine over 2028- 2034, covering the sum of grants, provision of budgetary guarantees and loans. The cap is also maintained in the Cypriot negotiating box.



- Confirmation of an indicative 10% financial envelope for actions supporting the external dimension of migration[2].
- Proposal to reduce the maximum support in the form of budgetary guarantees and financial assistance to non-EU countries other than Ukraine to €80 billion from €95 billion[3].

The **European Council meeting of 15–16 Oct. failed to produce a compromise on the MFF**, with the 'frugal' countries and the 'Friends of Cohesion' maintaining their opposing positions. However, press reports from Agence Europe and Contexte suggested a more constructive tone from some frugal countries after the summit. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz acknowledged that the negotiating box was 'moving in the right direction', while stressing that it remained insufficient, particularly on competitiveness and defence. Sweden maintained a harder line: caretaker Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson reiterated that his country would reject any proposal leading to a substantial increase in its EU budget contributions and said Sweden was 'in no hurry' to reach an agreement by the end of the year.

Domestic political considerations also entered the debate. Following the summit, President Emmanuel Macron reportedly indicated that approving an MFF agreement in the final weeks before the French presidential election in April 2027 would be difficult, adding pressure to reach a deal by December. The issue had also been raised by Marine Le Pen, the French far-right leader and a leading contender in the presidential race, who announced the day before the summit that she would seek to reduce France's net contribution to the EU budget to €5 billion per year, from an estimated €9-10 billion currently.

The Commission and Parliament also criticised the proposed cuts. In a debate at the General Affairs Council on 13 Oct., Budget Commissioner Piotr Serafin contested the Irish government's statement that the new negotiating box would represent 1.16% of EU GNI and warned that the Irish proposal would reduce the next MFF to 1.12% of EU GNI, lower than today's 1.13% for the 2021-2027 MFF. Excluding NextGenerationEU debt repayments, the figure would fall to 1.02% of EU GNI. In a joint press release, the leaders of the EPP, S&D, Renew, and Greens groups criticised the failure to incorporate Parliament's proposals on own resources and the groups also criticised the deep cuts to Heading 2 and Heading 3. They warned that these reductions would leave the EU less equipped to close its innovation and investment gap, support its partners, respond to crises and defend its interests and values amid rising global instability

Costa's preparatory work

On 21 Oct., Pedro Lourtie, head of cabinet to the President of the European Council, briefed the ambassadors of the 27 Member States on the **next steps in the negotiations on the 2028–2034** Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

Now that António Costa has taken the lead in the negotiations, his team will hold bilateral meetings with each permanent representative 'in the coming weeks'. His priority is to keep national contributions at a reasonable level by proposing a

[2] The 10% target in support of migration was proposed in the Cyprus negotiating box but remained within brackets.
[3] The Cyprus document maintained the maximum of €95 billion euros proposed by the Commission´s GEI proposal.

revised package of own resources. To this end, technical work is under way with the Commission **to recalibrate the package of own resources**. Costa also reportedly intends to strengthen the flexibility instruments available to respond to future crises, which were substantially scaled back in the Irish Presidency's proposal.

On the basis of these consultations and technical work, the President of the European Council will **present a new compromise document ahead of the special summit scheduled for 26–27 Nov.** The EU budget may also be discussed briefly at the **European Political Community meeting on 12 Nov.** and the **informal summit in Dublin on 13 Nov.**, although the latter will focus primarily on artificial intelligence.

Possible link between MFF negotiations and 2027 Ukraine financial package?

The European Council meeting of 26–27 Nov. will not focus exclusively on the MFF: EU leaders will also discuss how to finance Ukraine's needs in 2027. The issue has gained prominence in recent weeks. At the October European Council, President Zelensky warned that Ukraine would need at least €70 billion in additional support, on top of the €45 billion already earmarked for 2027 under the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan. President Costa has announced his intention to propose that the EU cover two-thirds of this 2027 Ukrainian gap (that is, €46.7 billion) and EU leaders have tasked the Commission with preparing a concrete proposal. While the details remain unclear, the most likely option is a new loan backed by the EU budget. As with the €90 billion loan agreed last December, some net beneficiary countries – Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary – have indicated that they may opt out. According to Politico, some frugal countries have warned that they may be less willing to support the Friends of Cohesion's demands for a larger MFF if these countries do not show solidarity with Kyiv.

3. Global Europe Negotiations: adoption in Parliament committee

In parallel with the overall MFF negotiation, during October the dispute between the Parliament's main political groups on the horizontal Performance Framework regulation was resolved, thus allowing the Parliament to restart the negotiations on sectoral programmes. With respect to GEI, on 19 Oct. the AFET-DEVE committees adopted the Gahler/Biedroń report on GEI. The Parliament's negotiating mandate is now expected to be adopted in plenary on **11-12 Nov**.

The key elements of the adopted AFET-DEVE report are as follows:

Money

- **Total envelope.** €225 billion in current prices (€198.6 billion in 2025 prices). Distribution per pillar in current prices: **Europe** €43.2 billion; **Middle East**, **North Africa and the Gulf** €42.9 billion (including a Gaza Reconstruction Fund, amount still open); **Sub-Saharan Africa** €60.5 billion; Asia-Pacific €17.1 billion; **Americas and Caribbean** €9.2 billion; **Global '**at least' €12.7 billion, a minimum that must be respected.



- **Emerging challenges and priorities cushion.** €14.8 billion, with new humanitarian needs listed first among its uses (Art. 7).
- **Ceiling on the maximum amount that can be used to provision budgetary guarantees and financial assistance.** Maximum €20 billion that can be drawn from the GEI geographic and global pillars to provision budgetary guarantees and financial assistance for all partner countries, excluding Ukraine, to ensure sufficient funding remains available for other types of support such as grants.
- **Priority to grant-based financing for low-income countries or partner countries in situations of fragility,** such as countries with unsustainable debt or limited borrowing capacity (Art. 23.6).
- **Maximum support in the form of budgetary guarantees and financial assistance** capped at €95 billion, with provisioning rates between 9% and 50%. The Commission can raise the caps by delegated act (by up to 20%, or 30% for Ukraine).
- **EIB as privileged partner.** Introduction of a dedicated €36 billion allocation to the EIB (Art. 25.1), of which €19 billion to provide support to partners other than Ukraine (20% of the general €95 billion guarantee). EIB also granted exclusivity for sovereign and non-commercial sub-sovereign operations.

Objectives

- **New general (strategic) objectives.** The shift is distinctly oriented towards strategic objectives, including: humanitarian aid, alignment of candidate countries with the EU acquis, human rights and civil society, economic and democratic resilience (including against hybrid threats and foreign interference), EU competitiveness and energy security, and support to Ukraine.
- **ODA targets.** At least 93% of spending must qualify as ODA. At least 20% of ODA goes to fragile and conflict-affected situations and least developed countries. At least 20% of ODA actions go to social inclusion and human development, with half of that for education and skills.
- **Expansion of gender targets.** Maintains that at least 85% of actions must have gender equality as a principal or significant objective (OECD DAC 1 or 2). It adds that at least 5% of those actions must have gender equality as a principal objective, and that targeted funding must be dedicated to women's rights organisations, without a percentage (Art. 6.5a).
- **Team Europe codified.** The Team Europe approach, encouraging the coordinated action of the Commission, the EEAS, and the Member States, is now codified under Article 11. However, the pooling of resources shall be discussed in advance with the Parliament.

Governance

- **Budgetary Authority Involvement.** The Adopted Report explicitly obligates the Commission to involve the Union budgetary authority (European Parliament and Council) in the adoption of performance plans with partner countries and any accompanying loan packages
- **Policy-based loan** agreements are subject to Parliament's prior approval (Art. 26.2). Policy-based loans, multiannual programmes and the Europe-pillar performance-based plans are adopted by delegated acts, which Parliament or Council can block (Arts. 17, 19, 26, 31).



- **Global Europe Investment Board.** A new board, which also serves as the Global Gateway Board, assists the Commission in implementing the budgetary guarantee and in selecting Global Gateway projects. It includes representatives of all Member States, the EIB and two representatives of the European Parliament, and is co-chaired by the Commission and the High Representative.
- **Exceptional measures.** Parliament and Council must be informed before exceptional assistance measures are adopted or substantially changed.

Conditionality

- **Migration conditionality.** Engagement with partner countries must follow a holistic and mutually beneficial approach aimed at addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement through sustainable development (Art. 12.1). The report adds procedural requirements: the Commission must assess broader socio-economic impacts, engage in dedicated dialogues, share readmission trend data with Parliament, and produce public reports while explicitly guaranteeing that suspensions shall in no case affect humanitarian assistance, basic services, human rights/democracy protection, or civil society support. The migration support must comply with the ODA eligibility criteria (Art. 12.2).
- **Exclusions from Suspension.** A suspension of funds under migration conditionality shall in no case affect humanitarian assistance, provision of basic services, protection of human rights and democracy and support to civil society organisations (CSOs) (Art. 12.4b).

4. What to watch next

- **Late November:** Costa presents his negotiating box ahead of 26-27 Nov.
- **11-12 Nov. 2026**: The Parliament adopts a partial negotiating position on GEI.
- **13 Nov. 2026:** Informal meeting of heads of state or government in Ireland (dedicated to artificial intelligence but possible talks on the MFF).
- **26–27 Nov. 2026:** Special European Council meeting explicitly dedicated to the MFF 2028-2034 negotiations and agreement on 2027 Ukrainian financial support.
- **17-18 Dec. 2026:** Costa's stated target for a Council-level agreement on the MFF, consistent with the June European Council conclusions committing to a deal by the end of 2026.

